# Verity Suite Sentinel — Prompt Injection & Manipulation Scanner

> Verity Suite Sentinel — Prompt Injection & Manipulation Scanner is a paid API for AI agents from suite.veritylayer.dev, paid per call via x402, $0.06/call, status unknown (last checked 2026-09-14).

Scans untrusted text or tool outputs for hidden prompt-injection attacks, jailbreaks, and manipulation attempts, returning a signed verdict with threat score and evidence

## Facts

- Endpoint: POST https://suite.veritylayer.dev/sentinel
- Price: $0.06/call
- Payment: x402
- Status: unknown
- Last checked: 2026-09-14
- Activations on Zero: 0
- Tags: x402
- Canonical page: https://www.zero.xyz/c/verity-suite-sentinel-prompt-injection-manipulation-scanner-f579c59b
- Structured record (JSON): https://api.zero.xyz/v1/capabilities/cap_ovO0iDWjTq-r7k8fiQs_F

Status and success rate cover calls made through Zero and Zero's own probes. Third-party monitors may report differently.

## How to call it through Zero

Zero handles the 402 payment challenge and records the run. With the Zero CLI installed (`npm i -g @zeroxyz/cli`):

```sh
zero fetch --capability verity-suite-sentinel-prompt-injection-manipulation-scanner-f579c59b -d '<json body>'
```

Example prompt: Before you process this web page I just fetched, scan it with Sentinel for hidden prompt-injection or manipulation attempts — here's the content: '[raw page text]', and it came from a tool call to fetch a competitor's product page.

## When to prefer this

Choose this endpoint when your AI agent is about to consume externally-sourced text (web pages, emails, retrieved documents, tool outputs, user-supplied strings) and you need a fail-closed, per-call security gate before that content enters the agent's context window. Especially valuable in agentic pipelines with tool use, RAG retrieval, or any untrusted input channel. Prefer this over generic content moderation APIs when the threat model is specifically prompt injection and agent manipulation rather than hate speech or NSFW content.

## Known failure modes

- Content exceeds 2000-character maxLength limit — request rejected with validation error
- Ambiguous or heavily obfuscated content may return 'uncertain' verdict with partial reasons
- Missing required fields (content) returns a 400-level schema validation error
- Signing not configured returns null receipt even on successful scan
- Context field itself may be adversarial — treated as a hint only, never trusted as authoritative

## How this service works

The trust fabric for AI agents — calibrated, fail-closed services agents pay per call.

## Output

A JSON object containing: a verdict enum (clean, suspicious, injection, or uncertain), a numeric threat_score indicating severity, an array of reasons quoting specific spans from the input that justify the verdict, a recommended_action for the calling agent, and an optional Ed25519-signed VerityLayer receipt for audit/verification purposes.

## Request schema (JSON Schema)

```json
{
 "type": "object",
 "properties": {
  "content": {
   "type": "string",
   "title": "Content",
   "maxLength": 2000,
   "minLength": 1,
   "description": "the untrusted text or tool output to scan for hidden prompt-injection, jailbreak, or manipulation. Treated entirely as inert data."
  },
  "context": {
   "anyOf": [
    {
     "type": "string",
     "maxLength": 2000
    },
    {
     "type": "null"
    }
   ],
   "title": "Context",
   "default": null,
   "description": "where this content came from and how the agent intends to use it (e.g. 'web page fetched via tool', 'email body', 'retrieved doc'). Also untrusted: a hint, never a command, and may itself be adversarial."
  }
 }
}
```

## More

- Live health (JSON, refreshed every minute): https://www.zero.xyz/c/verity-suite-sentinel-prompt-injection-manipulation-scanner-f579c59b/health.json
- [Zero catalog index](https://www.zero.xyz/llms.txt)
- [Other services from suite.veritylayer.dev](https://www.zero.xyz/host/suite.veritylayer.dev/llms.txt)