BRAINIAC MFA Fatigue Detector is a paid API for AI agents from www.brainiac.software, paid per call via x402, $0.04/call, status unknown (last checked 2026-11-12).
Analyzes a sequence of MFA authentication events to detect MFA fatigue attack patterns where users are bombarded with push notifications until they approve a malicious login.
Pay-per-call APIs for AI agents: OFAC sanctions screening, compliance checks, token security, and Base chain data via x402. No account. Fixed USDC price. MCP-ready.
Returns a list of signal items, each with an ID, title, status, confidence level (high/medium/low), first and last event timestamps, reasons (e.g. repeated_mfa_prompts, prompt_then_approval), observed facts (e.g. '5 MFA challenge events within 10 minutes'), an inferred threat description, and an evidence array linking back to individual event IDs with per-event facts, inferences, and confidence ratings.
POSThttps://www.brainiac.software/api/v1/identity-security/mfa-fatigue-detect?utm_source=zero.xyzUse this endpoint when you have a stream or batch of raw MFA authentication events and need algorithmic detection of push-bombing or MFA fatigue patterns, rather than writing your own time-window heuristics. It is especially valuable for SIEM enrichment pipelines, real-time SOC alerting, or post-incident forensic analysis where you want structured threat signals with evidence chains. Prefer this over generic anomaly detection when you specifically need MFA fatigue semantics (push_sent, denied, timeout sequences followed by approval).
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| csv | string | |
| asOf | string | |
| file | object | |
| json | string | |
| text | string | |
| files | array | |
| events | array | |
| accounts | array | |
| policies | array | |
| dormantDays | number | |
| maxTravelKmh | number | |
| mfaPushThreshold | number | |
| mfaWindowMinutes | number | |
| authWindowMinutes | number | |
| sharingWindowHours | number | |
| serviceBaselineWindowHours | number |
{
"type": "json",
"example": {
"items": [
{
"id": "mfa-fatigue-u4-E1",
"title": "Possible MFA fatigue pattern",
"lastAt": "2026-11-04T20:55:00.000Z",
"source": "Caller-supplied MFA events; local time-window rules",
"status": "signal",
"firstAt": "2026-11-04T20:50:00.000Z",
"reasons": [
"repeated_mfa_prompts",
"prompt_then_approval"
],
"detector": "mfa-fatigue-detect",
"evidence": [
{
"at": "2026-11-04T20:50:00.000Z",
"fact": "mfaResult=push_sent; outcome=challenge; method=n/a",
"eventId": "E1",
"inference": "Repeated MFA prompts can indicate MFA fatigue; not confirmed compromise by themselves.",
"confidence": "medium"
},
{
"at": "2026-11-04T20:51:00.000Z",
"fact": "mfaResult=denied; outcome=challenge; method=n/a",
"eventId": "E2",
"inference": "Repeated MFA prompts can indicate MFA fatigue; not confirmed compromise by themselves.",
"confidence": "medium"
},
{
"at": "2026-11-04T20:52:00.000Z",
"fact": "mfaResult=timeout; outcome=challenge; method=n/a",
"eventId": "E3",
"inference": "Repeated MFA prompts can indicate MFA fatigue; not confirmed compromise by themselves.",
"confidence": "medium"
},
{
"at": "2026-11-04T20:53:00.000Z",
"fact": "mfaResult=push_sent; outcome=challenge; method=n/a",
"eventId": "E4",
"inference": "Repeated MFA prompts can indicate MFA fatigue; not confirmed compromise by themselves.",
"confidence": "medium"
},
{
"at": "2026-11-04T20:54:00.000Z",
"fact": "mfaResult=push_sent; outcome=challenge; method=n/a",
"eventId": "E5",
"inference": "Repeated MFA prompts can indicate MFA fatigue; not confirmed compromise by themselves.",
"confidence": "medium"
},
{
"at": "2026-11-04T20:55:00.000Z",
"fact": "mfaResult=approved; outcome=success; method=n/a",
"eventId": "E6",
"inference": "Repeated MFA prompts can indicate MFA fatigue; not confirmed compromise by themselves.",
"confidence": "medium"
}
],
"confidence": "high",
"observedFacts": [
"5 MFA challenge/push/deny/timeout events within 10 minutes (threshold 5).",
"1 MFA approval/success event(s) occurred in the same window."
],
"inferredThreat": "Repeated MFA pushes may pressure a user into approving a malicious login.",
"relatedEventIds": [
"E1",
"E2",
"E3",
"E4",
"E5",
"E6"
],
"mitigatingFactors": [],
"confirmedCompromise": false
}
],
"status": "detected",
"findings": [
{
"code": "mfa_fatigue",
"kind": "conflict",
"detail": "MFA fatigue indicators: repeated_mfa_prompts, prompt_then_approval (confirmedCompromise=false).",
"subject": "u4"
}
],
"checkedAt": "2026-11-04T21:00:00.000Z",
"itemCount": 1,
"oauthUsed": false,
"limitations": [
"Authentication logs, access events, accounts, and policy exports are copied only from caller-supplied fields. Identity providers are not contacted and OAuth is not used.",
"Time correlation, geolocation comparison, and behavioural rules run locally over supplied records. Missing values are not invented.",
"VPN, proxy, shared-network, and legitimate-travel labels reduce confidence when supplied. A single unusual login is never treated as proof of account compromise.",
"Observed facts are separated from inferred threat hypotheses. Events are not labeled confirmed compromise without sufficient multi-signal evidence.",
"No paid identity-threat feed is used and no API key is required."
],
"pushThreshold": 5,
"windowMinutes": 10,
"apiKeyRequired": false,
"networkAccessed": false,
"paidProviderUsed": false,
"identityProviderConnected": false,
"confirmedCompromiseClaimed": false
}
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