BRAINIAC Session Hijacking Signal Detector is a paid API for AI agents from www.brainiac.software, paid per call via x402, $0.04/call, status unknown (last checked 2026-11-12).
Analyzes a sequence of authentication and session events to detect signals of session hijacking — such as IP changes, device swaps, and user-agent changes within the same session ID.
Pay-per-call APIs for AI agents: OFAC sanctions screening, compliance checks, token security, and Base chain data via x402. No account. Fixed USDC price. MCP-ready.
Returns a JSON object with a list of detected session hijacking signal items, each containing a title, confidence level, first/last seen timestamps, reasons triggered (e.g. session_ip_change, device_swap_on_session), observed facts, inferred threat description, evidence entries with per-event facts and confidence, mitigating factors, and a confirmedCompromise boolean. Also includes top-level findings with codes and subjects, overall status, and limitations disclaiming that identity providers are not contacted.
POSThttps://www.brainiac.software/api/v1/identity-security/session-hijacking-signal-detect?utm_source=zero.xyzUse this endpoint when you have structured session or authentication event logs and want to detect session hijacking signals locally without contacting identity providers. Ideal for SOC automation, incident triage, or periodic security audits where you want fast, pay-per-call analysis with no account setup. Prefer this over general anomaly detection when you specifically need session-scoped signals like IP changes, device swaps, and user-agent changes within a session ID.
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| csv | string | |
| asOf | string | |
| file | object | |
| json | string | |
| text | string | |
| files | array | |
| events | array | |
| accounts | array | |
| policies | array | |
| dormantDays | number | |
| maxTravelKmh | number | |
| mfaPushThreshold | number | |
| mfaWindowMinutes | number | |
| authWindowMinutes | number | |
| sharingWindowHours | number | |
| serviceBaselineWindowHours | number |
{
"type": "json",
"example": {
"items": [
{
"id": "session-hijack-s1",
"title": "Suspicious session change/reuse",
"lastAt": "2026-11-04T19:20:00.000Z",
"source": "Caller-supplied session fields; local rules only",
"status": "signal",
"firstAt": "2026-11-04T19:00:00.000Z",
"reasons": [
"session_ip_change",
"session_device_change",
"session_ua_change",
"device_swap_on_session"
],
"detector": "session-hijacking-signal-detect",
"evidence": [
{
"at": "2026-11-04T19:00:00.000Z",
"fact": "session=S1; ip=203.0.113.10; device=laptop-1",
"eventId": "E1",
"inference": "Session change/reuse indicators are not proof of hijacking alone.",
"confidence": "medium"
},
{
"at": "2026-11-04T19:20:00.000Z",
"fact": "session=S1; ip=198.51.100.55; device=phone-9",
"eventId": "E2",
"inference": "Session change/reuse indicators are not proof of hijacking alone.",
"confidence": "medium"
}
],
"confidence": "high",
"observedFacts": [
"Session S1 has 2 related event(s).",
"Session reused across IPs: 203.0.113.10, 198.51.100.55.",
"Session reused across devices: laptop-1, phone-9.",
"User-Agent changed within the same session id.",
"Event E2 changed device from laptop-1 to phone-9."
],
"inferredThreat": "Session identifiers appearing across IPs/devices/users can indicate hijacking or shared clients.",
"relatedEventIds": [
"E1",
"E2"
],
"mitigatingFactors": [],
"confirmedCompromise": false
}
],
"status": "detected",
"findings": [
{
"code": "session_hijack_signal",
"kind": "conflict",
"detail": "Session signals: session_ip_change, session_device_change, session_ua_change, device_swap_on_session (confirmedCompromise=false).",
"subject": "S1"
}
],
"checkedAt": "2026-11-04T21:00:00.000Z",
"itemCount": 1,
"oauthUsed": false,
"limitations": [
"Authentication logs, access events, accounts, and policy exports are copied only from caller-supplied fields. Identity providers are not contacted and OAuth is not used.",
"Time correlation, geolocation comparison, and behavioural rules run locally over supplied records. Missing values are not invented.",
"VPN, proxy, shared-network, and legitimate-travel labels reduce confidence when supplied. A single unusual login is never treated as proof of account compromise.",
"Observed facts are separated from inferred threat hypotheses. Events are not labeled confirmed compromise without sufficient multi-signal evidence.",
"No paid identity-threat feed is used and no API key is required."
],
"apiKeyRequired": false,
"networkAccessed": false,
"paidProviderUsed": false,
"identityProviderConnected": false,
"confirmedCompromiseClaimed": false
}
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