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LineageLint GitHub Actions Workflow Risk Analyzer
x402
LineageLint GitHub Actions Workflow Risk Analyzer is a paid API for AI agents from 47-85-47-24.sslip.io, paid per call via x402, $0.001/call, status unknown (last checked 2026-09-13).
Statically analyzes a GitHub Actions workflow for security risks including privilege escalation, untrusted checkouts, and GITHUB_TOKEN misuse, returning a scored verdict (BLOCK/WARN/PASS).
Price / call$0.001
Success—
StatusUnknown
How this service works
An autonomous paid API accepting USDC on Base mainnet.
Output
Returns a JSON object with a verdict (BLOCK/WARN/PASS), integer risk score (0-100), human-readable summary, per-job analysis including permission modes and untrusted checkout flags, a findings array with severity/code/remediation for each issue, approval gates, and a coverage report describing what checks were and were not performed.
Example use cases
CI/CD pipeline approval gate automation
“Before we merge this new workflow file, can you analyze it for security risks and let me know if there are any privilege escalation or token misuse issues I should fix first?”
Automated security scanning for team onboarding
“Our team just added a bunch of new GitHub Actions workflows. Run security checks on all of them and flag anything risky so we can remediate before they go live.”
Incident response for compromised runner
“We think one of our self-hosted runners might have been compromised. Analyze our workflows to see if any of them are exposed to privilege escalation or untrusted checkout vulnerabilities that an attacker could exploit.”
Technical details
Endpoint
GEThttps://47-85-47-24.sslip.io/v1/github-actions-workflow-riskWhen to prefer
Use this endpoint when you need a fast, static security audit of a GitHub Actions workflow — specifically for risks like pull_request_target privilege escalation, write-all GITHUB_TOKEN permissions, unpinned actions, and untrusted checkouts — and want a machine-readable verdict with severity-graded findings. Prefer this over general SAST tools when the focus is GitHub Actions-specific workflow security posture rather than application code vulnerabilities.
Side effects
- Invalid or unsupported scenario enum value returns a 400 or validation error
- Payment not included or insufficient USDC results in a 402 Payment Required response
- Network timeout if the analysis backend is unavailable
- Missing required 'input' body property returns schema validation error
- Unsupported HTTP method returns 405
Input
Schema · Request body
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| inputrequired | object | |
| output | object |
Output
Schema · Response
{
"type": "json",
"example": {
"jobs": [
{
"index": 1,
"job_id": "publish",
"step_count": 3,
"runner_class": "self-hosted-or-dynamic",
"has_environment": false,
"permission_mode": "write-all",
"write_scope_count": 16,
"untrusted_checkout": true,
"action_reference_count": 2
}
],
"label": "paid-demo:privileged-pr-publisher",
"stats": {
"job_count": 1,
"line_count": 18,
"step_count": 3,
"shell_step_count": 1,
"findings_by_severity": {
"low": 0,
"high": 5,
"medium": 4,
"critical": 4
},
"unpinned_action_count": 2,
"action_reference_count": 2,
"write_capable_job_count": 1
},
"events": [
"pull_request_target"
],
"profile": "public",
"summary": "BLOCK: 13 finding(s) across 1 job(s); 9 require resolution or explicit approval.",
"verdict": "BLOCK",
"coverage": {
"mode": "static-github-actions-workflow-yaml",
"checks": [
"GITHUB_TOKEN least privilege",
"pull_request_target and workflow_run trust boundaries",
"untrusted-context script injection",
"action and reusable-workflow immutable pinning",
"self-hosted runner exposure",
"secret handling and delegation",
"OIDC environment protection",
"workflow artifact trust"
],
"limitations": [
"Does not inspect referenced action source, repository settings, environment protection rules, or cloud OIDC trust policies.",
"Cannot prove whether a commit SHA belongs to the expected upstream action repository.",
"Static findings do not replace CodeQL workflow scanning, policy enforcement, or a review of every third-party action."
],
"workflow_executed": false,
"github_api_contacted": false,
"repository_checked_out": false,
"secret_values_returned": false
},
"findings": [
{
"code": "job_write_all_permissions",
"path": "jobs.publish.permissions",
"message": "The job grants write access to every supported GITHUB_TOKEN scope.",
"severity": "critical",
"standard": "github-actions-workflow-syntax",
"remediation": "Grant only the exact scopes this job needs and separate untrusted processing from privileged work."
},
{
"code": "pull_request_target_untrusted_checkout",
"path": "jobs.publish.steps[0].with.ref",
"message": "A privileged pull_request_target job checks out attacker-controlled pull-request code.",
"severity": "critical",
"standard": "github-actions-untrusted-checkout",
"remediation": "Do not check out or execute pull-request head code in pull_request_target; use an unprivileged pull_request workflow."
},
{
"code": "privileged_secret_to_unpinned_action",
"path": "jobs.publish.steps[2]",
"message": "A privileged pull_request_target job exposes a secret-bearing input to a non-immutable action.",
"severity": "critical",
"standard": "github-actions-supply-chain",
"remediation": "Remove the secret from this event path and pin any trusted action to a reviewed full commit SHA."
},
{
"code": "write_all_permissions",
"path": "permissions",
"message": "The workflow grants write access to every supported GITHUB_TOKEN scope.",
"severity": "critical",
"standard": "github-actions-workflow-syntax",
"remediation": "Replace write-all with explicit least-privilege scopes and isolate privileged jobs."
},
{
"code": "literal_secret_like_workflow_env",
"path": "env",
"message": "Workflow-level env contains 1 literal secret-like value(s); names and values are omitted.",
"severity": "high",
"standard": "github-actions-secrets",
"remediation": "Store credentials in GitHub secrets or use OIDC for short-lived cloud access."
},
{
"code": "self_hosted_runner_on_untrusted_trigger",
"path": "jobs.publish.runs-on",
"message": "A self-hosted or dynamically selected runner can process attacker-controlled public-repository events.",
"severity": "high",
"standard": "github-actions-runner-security",
"remediation": "Use a GitHub-hosted ephemeral runner, or gate self-hosted execution behind trusted approval and isolated infrastructure."
},
{
"code": "checkout_persists_token_with_untrusted_code",
"path": "jobs.publish.steps[0].with.persist-credentials",
"message": "Checkout keeps repository credentials available while untrusted code is present.",
"severity": "high",
"standard": "github-actions-untrusted-checkout",
"remediation": "Set persist-credentials: false and separate privileged operations into a trusted job."
},
{
"code": "untrusted_context_in_inline_script",
"path": "jobs.publish.steps[1].run",
"message": "Attacker-controlled GitHub context is interpolated directly into an inline script.",
"severity": "high",
"standard": "github-actions-script-injection",
"remediation": "Assign the expression to an environment variable and consume it as quoted data, or use a purpose-built action."
},
{
"code": "literal_secret_like_step_input",
"path": "jobs.publish.steps[2]",
"message": "The step contains 1 literal secret-like input or env value(s); names and values are omitted.",
"severity": "high",
"standard": "github-actions-secrets",
"remediation": "Reference GitHub secrets through a narrowly scoped env/input or use OIDC instead of embedding credentials."
},
{
"code": "oidc_write_without_environment",
"path": "jobs.publish.permissions.id-token",
"message": "The job can mint an OIDC token without declaring a protected GitHub environment.",
"severity": "medium",
"standard": "github-actions-oidc",
"remediation": "Bind cloud trust to immutable claims and use an environment with protection rules for deployments."
},
{
"code": "action_not_immutable_pinned",
"path": "jobs.publish.steps[0].uses",
"message": "An action or container image is not pinned to an immutable commit SHA or image digest.",
"severity": "medium",
"standard": "github-actions-supply-chain",
"remediation": "Pin repository actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA and container actions to sha256 digests."
},
{
"code": "action_not_immutable_pinned",
"path": "jobs.publish.steps[2].uses",
"message": "An action or container image is not pinned to an immutable commit SHA or image digest.",
"severity": "medium",
"standard": "github-actions-supply-chain",
"remediation": "Pin repository actions to a reviewed 40-character commit SHA and container actions to sha256 digests."
},
{
"code": "privileged_pull_request_target_trigger",
"path": "on.pull_request_target",
"message": "pull_request_target runs in the base repository's privileged context.",
"severity": "medium",
"standard": "github-actions-secure-use",
"remediation": "Use pull_request when possible; otherwise keep the workflow metadata-only and never execute untrusted pull-request code."
}
],
"risk_score": 100,
"analysis_id": "workflow-a127c053ca9bb4db0bdc",
"approval_gates": [
"Resolve or explicitly approve 9 critical/high finding(s) before enabling the workflow.",
"Demonstrate that attacker-controlled code and data cannot cross into a privileged token, secret, cache, artifact, or runner boundary.",
"Confirm that every credential is short-lived or narrowly scoped and cannot be emitted to logs or delegated to untrusted code.",
"Review and immutable-pin 2 external action or reusable-workflow reference(s)."
],
"analyzer_version": "workflowguard-github-actions/1.0",
"untrusted_event_classes": [
"pull_request_target"
]
}
}Tags
x402
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