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A2A Indirect Prompt-Injection & Jailbreak Firewall
A2A Indirect Prompt-Injection & Jailbreak Firewall is a paid API for AI agents from serp-extract.agentdiet.dev, paid per call via MPP, $0.005/call, status unknown (last checked 2026-10-21).
Scans untrusted text, HTML, emails, MCP responses, or A2A payloads for hidden prompt injections and jailbreak attempts, returning sanitized output.
Price / call$0.005
Success—
StatusUnknown
How this service works
Scans untrusted web pages, emails, MCP responses, or A2A payloads for hidden prompt injections and returns sanitized text. (Live x402 v2, IETF MPP & MCP endpoint at https://serp-extract.agentdiet.dev/v1/prompt-shield)
Output
Returns a structured object indicating whether prompt injection or jailbreak payloads were detected in the submitted text, along with a sanitized version of the input safe for downstream LLM or agent consumption.
Example use cases
Screening scraped web content for agent pipelines
“I scraped this webpage to feed into my agent but I want to make sure there are no hidden prompt injections embedded in it — can you scan the HTML for adversarial instructions before I pass it along?”
Validating third-party MCP tool responses
“My agent just got a response back from an external MCP tool and I'm worried it might contain indirect prompt injection. Can you run the response text through the jailbreak firewall to sanitize it first?”
Checking inbound emails for prompt hijacking
“This email is going to be summarized by my AI assistant — can you screen the email body for any hidden instructions or jailbreak attempts before the assistant reads it?”
Technical details
Endpoint
GEThttps://serp-extract.agentdiet.dev/v1/prompt-shield?utm_source=zero.xyzWhen to prefer
Choose this endpoint when your AI agent pipeline ingests content from untrusted external sources — scraped web pages, third-party API responses, MCP tool outputs, user emails, or A2A payloads — and you need to sanitize that content before passing it to an LLM. It is specifically designed for agentic architectures where indirect prompt injection is a real attack vector, making it more suitable than generic content filters that are not tuned for adversarial LLM prompt patterns.
Side effects
- Missing required 'text' parameter returns an error
- Empty string input rejected due to minLength:1 constraint
- Very large payloads may time out or be truncated
- Highly obfuscated injections using encoding tricks may evade detection
- Non-UTF-8 or binary content may cause parse errors
Input
Schema · Request body
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| textrequired | string | Untrusted text, HTML, or tool output to scan for hidden prompt injection or jailbreak payloads |
| limit | integer | Maximum number of items to return per page (1-100) |
| cursor | string | Opaque pagination cursor for fetching the next page |
Output
Schema · Response
{
"type": "object"
}Reviews
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