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A2A Indirect Prompt-Injection & Jailbreak Firewall
A2A Indirect Prompt-Injection & Jailbreak Firewall is a paid API for AI agents from workflows.agentdiet.dev, paid per call via MPP, $0.005/call, status unknown (last checked 2026-10-21).
Scans untrusted text, HTML, emails, MCP responses, or A2A payloads for hidden prompt injections and jailbreak attempts, returning sanitized output.
Price / call$0.005
Success—
StatusUnknown
How this service works
Scans untrusted web pages, emails, MCP responses, or A2A payloads for hidden prompt injections and returns sanitized text. (Live x402 v2, IETF MPP & MCP endpoint at https://workflows.agentdiet.dev/v1/prompt-guard)
Output
Returns an object containing the sanitized version of the input text with any detected prompt injection or jailbreak payloads removed or flagged, along with detection metadata indicating whether malicious content was found.
Example use cases
Guard agent pipeline from malicious web content
“I'm about to feed this scraped article into my summarization agent — can you first scan it for any hidden prompt injections or adversarial instructions embedded in the HTML and return the clean text?”
Screen incoming email before LLM processing
“This email came from an unknown sender and my agent is about to read it. Can you run it through the prompt-injection firewall first to make sure there are no jailbreak attempts hidden in the body before my agent acts on it?”
Validate MCP tool response before execution
“My agent just got back a response from an external MCP tool and I want to make sure it's safe — can you scan this payload for any indirect prompt injections or hidden instructions before I let the agent continue?”
Technical details
Endpoint
GEThttps://workflows.agentdiet.dev/v1/prompt-guard?utm_source=zero.xyzWhen to prefer
Choose this endpoint when your AI agent pipeline ingests untrusted external content — scraped web pages, emails, MCP/A2A tool responses, or user-submitted text — before passing it to an LLM, especially when operating in agentic workflows where indirect prompt injection could hijack agent behavior. Prefer this over generic content filters when you specifically need protection against adversarial LLM manipulation techniques rather than just harmful content moderation.
Side effects
- Empty or missing 'text' parameter returns a validation error
- Extremely large payloads may timeout or be truncated
- Sophisticated obfuscated injections may evade detection
- Ambiguous or borderline content may produce false positives
- Service unavailability returns HTTP 402 or 5xx errors
Input
Schema · Request body
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| textrequired | string | Untrusted text, HTML, or tool output to scan for hidden prompt injection or jailbreak payloads |
Output
Schema · Response
{
"type": "object"
}Reviews
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